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Human voluntary actions are often associated with a distinctive subjective experience
termed ‘sense of agency’. This experience could be a reconstructive inference triggered by
monitoring one's actions and their outcomes, or a read-out of brain processes related to
action preparation, or some hybrid of these. Participants pressed a key with the right index
finger at a time of their own choice, while viewing a rotating clock. Occasionally they
received a mild shock on the same finger. They were instructed to press the key as quickly
as possible if they felt a shock. On some trials, trains of subliminal shocks were also
delivered, to investigate whether such subliminal cues could influence the initiation of
voluntary actions, or the subjective experience of such actions. Participants' keypress were
always followed by a tone 250 ms later. At the end of each trial they reported the time of
the keypress using the rotating clock display. Shifts in the perceived time of the action
towards the following tone, compared to a baseline condition containing only a keypress
but no tone, were taken as implicit measures of sense of agency. The subliminal shock
train enhanced this “action binding” effect in healthy participants, relative to trials without
such shocks. This difference could not be attributed to retrospective inference, since the
perceptual events were identical in both trial types. Further, we tested the same paradigm
in a patient with anarchic hand syndrome (AHS). Subliminal shocks again enhanced our
measure of sense of agency in the unaffected hand, but had a reversed effect on the
‘anarchic’ hand. These findings suggest an interaction between internal volitional signals
and external cues afforded by the external environment. Damage to the neural pathways
that mediate interactions between internal states and the outside world may explain some
of the clinical signs of AHS.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).e Neuroscience, University College London, Alexandra House, 17 Queen Square, London
c.uk (N. Khalighinejad).
d by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
c o r t e x 9 0 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 5 8e7 0 591. Introduction
Voluntary actions can be functionally defined by two key
properties: they are internally-generated, as opposed to trig-
gered by external stimuli, and they are often goal-directed
(Passingham, Bengtsson, & Lau, 2010). In addition, they are
associated with two specific subjective experiences: an expe-
rience of volition, and an experience of agency. The experi-
ence of volition refers to pre-movement states and events
such as desiring, intending, trying and initiating, while “sense
of agency” refers to the experience that one's voluntary ac-
tions cause outcomes in the external world.
On one view, the experiences of volition and agency are
post-hoc inferences, triggered bymonitoring one's actions and
their outcomes. In this case, preparatory brain events that
precede action should not influence this experience (Wegner
& Wheatley, 1999), although a “prior conscious thought”
about acting may be necessary to trigger such inferences
(Wegner, 2003). Alternatively, experience of agency could
depend on a readout of brain processes in frontal (Fried,
Mukamel, & Kreiman, 2011) and/or parietal areas
(Desmurget et al., 2009) that precede voluntary action.
Importantly, these two views make different predictions
about how external stimuli might influence the experience of
agency: If experience of agency is merely a reconstructive
inference, interventions which influence brain processes
preceding a voluntary action should have no influence on
one's sense of agency, unless those interventions generate
some perceptual event which can figure in the inference. On
the other hand, if experience of agency depends on internal
precursor signals that drive voluntary action, any intervention
that influences these signals may also affect experience of
agency, whether the intervention is consciously perceived or
not.
In neuroscience, voluntary actions are often linked to a
medial frontal pathway associated with internally-generated
movement, as opposed to a parietal-lateral frontal pathway
for reacting to external stimuli (Passingham et al., 2010).
Human experiments drawing on this tradition usually require
participants to perform actions at a time of their own free
choice, though this approach has been criticised for lack of
ecological validity (Schu¨u¨r & Haggard, 2011). Intervening on
volition in such paradigms is methodologically difficult,
because the experimenter cannot know when the participant
will act. Further, any experimental intervention on precursor
processes should preserve the ‘internally-generated’ aspect of
voluntary action, rather than switching to a reactive mode of
responding. Subliminal priming offers one potential method
for studying volition. For example, subliminal visual primes
have been used previously to manipulate the sense of agency
by increasing the fluency of action selection processes
(Chambon & Haggard, 2012). Priming can “nudge” the brain
towards selecting one action rather than another (Eimer &
Schlaghecken, 1998). Compatible priming also increases
sense of agency, as if the prime had made the action more
strongly intentional (Wenke, Fleming, & Haggard, 2010).
However, subliminal visual priming paradigms require a
precise temporal relation between prime and a supraliminal
‘go’ signal. They therefore involve externally-triggered ratherthan internally-generated voluntary actions. Here, we used a
novel design with subliminal electrocutaneous stimuli as a
probe to influence brain processes preceding a voluntary ac-
tion. We investigated how experimental manipulation of pu-
tative precursor signals can change the experience of agency
in healthy adults and in an individual with ‘anarchic hand
syndrome’ (AHS).
Healthy participants were asked to make voluntary key
presses with their right index finger at a time of their own
choosing. They occasionally received a mild electrocutaneous
shocks on the same finger, and were instructed to press the
key in reaction to such shocks as quickly as possible. This
instruction aimed to set up a facilitatory association between
shock and action. We reasoned that establishing a stimulus-
response association between supraliminal shocks and ac-
tions would make the shock meaningful for action, and
therefore more likely to prime action processing. Both
voluntary and reactive keypresses were followed by a beep
250 ms later. Participants judged the time of the keypress
using a rotating clock display. A shift in the perceived time of
the action towards the following tone, compared to a baseline
condition containing only a keypress but no tone, has been
proposed as an implicit marker of agency (Haggard, Clark, &
Kalogeras, 2002). Crucially, the shift in action awareness to-
wards the subsequent tone appears to reflect volitional sig-
nals, since it is absent for involuntary movements (Cravo,
Claessens, & Baldo, 2009), and increases with the amount of
information that participantsmust generate internally (Barlas
& Obhi, 2013).
Further, we delivered a train of subliminal shocks in some
trials selected at random. We reasoned that the subliminal
shocks might influence brain processes preceding voluntary
action, because of the established association between shock
and keypress. Because subliminal trials contained the same
perceptual events as voluntary trials without subliminal
shocks, any inferential processes should operate identically
on both trial types. However, if sense of agency depends on a
readout of brain processes that precede voluntary actions, and
if these processes can be influenced by subliminal stimuli, we
might expect subliminal shock trains to affect sense of
agency, as measured by intentional binding. Since the clas-
sical effect of subliminal priming is to facilitate voluntary
actions, and since we included other supraliminal shock trials
specifically involving such a link, we predicted stronger
binding for voluntary actions on trials with subliminal shocks,
compared to trials without subliminal shocks.
We also tested the same paradigmwith a single patient, TP,
with AHS. AHS is a rare neurological disorder characterized by
abnormal voluntary control over a limb (Kranick & Hallett,
2013). Three main variants of AHS have been distinguished
in the neuropsychological literature: frontal, callosal and
posterior. The most common pathologies underlying AHS is
corticobasal syndrome, stroke and CreutzfeldteJakob disease
(Hassan& Josephs, 2016). Patients often describe their affected
arm as ‘alien’ or ‘having a mind of its own’. The movements
are often goal-directed and triggered by external stimuli, but
the patients are not able to control or stop them (Moore &
Fletcher, 2012). Cognitive neuropsychologists have generally
interpreted signs and symptoms of AHS using ‘object afford-
ance theory’. Affordances are properties of objects in the
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McBride, Sumner, Jackson, Bajaj, & Husain, 2013). In healthy
individuals, excessive reactivity to external stimuli is usually
suppressed by endogenous control mechanisms within
medial frontal cortex (Sumner & Husain, 2008). Accordingly,
impairment of these control mechanisms in AHS lead to pa-
tients becoming excessively responsive to external stimuli,
even when they do not intend or wish to respond to them
(McBride et al., 2013; Riddoch, Edwards, Humphreys, West, &
Heafield, 1998). In particular, the patients with AHS,
including patient TP studied here, often involuntarily grasp
external objects.
Cognitive neuropsychological accounts emphasise a form
of “negative volition”, inwhich the lesioned cortexwould have
the normal role of ensuring tonic voluntary suppression of
latent responses to environmental affordances. No studies, to
our knowledge, have investigated how the damage underlying
AHS influences the processes that generate voluntary action
itself. One hypothesis, consistent with neuronal (Fried et al.,
2011) and areal (Filevich, Ku¨hn, & Haggard, 2012) evidence of
intermingled action-promoting and action-suppressing rep-
resentations in medial frontal cortex, predicts the damage
that leads to AHS should also affect the generation, and
experience of voluntary action.2. Material and methods
2.1. Participants
47 healthy volunteers, aged 18e35 years of age (14 males,
mean age ¼ 22.4 years, SD ¼ 3.9), were recruited from the
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience subject data pool. All
participants were right handed, had normal or corrected to
normal vision, had no history or family history of seizure,
epilepsy or any neurologic or psychiatric disorder. Partici-
pants confirmed that they had not participated in any brain
stimulation experiment in the last 48 h, nor had consumed
alcohol in the last 24 h. Participants were paid an institution-
approved amount for participating in the experiment. Exper-
imental design and procedure were approved by the UCL
research ethics committee, and followed the principles of the
Declaration of Helsinki.
TP is a 54 year old, right handed woman. She is a former
secretary with 11 years of education. Twenty-three months
before the testing session, she had a ruptured aneurysm of the
right anterior cerebral artery, resulting in subarachnoid hae-
morrhage, involving the genu and trunk of the corpus callosum
(CC). After embolization, she had a vasospasm of the right
middle cerebral artery. The most recent magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) (14 months before the testing session) showed
damage in the CC (genu, body and splenium) and in the right
anterior frontal and right basal frontal cortex, involving the
anterior and middle cingulate gyrus (Fig. 1 & Table 1).
A complete neuropsychological examination (Table 2) at
the time of the testing session showed residual attentional
deficits (in the subtests “alertness”, “acoustical vigilance” and
“divided attention” of the Italian version of the Test of
Attentional Performance: Zimmerman & Fimm, 1992;
Zoccolotti, Pizzamiglio, Pittau, & Galati, 1994), mildimpairments in perspective memory (Rivermead Behavioural
Memory Test: Wilson, Cockburn, & Baddeley, 1985), abstract
classification abilities (Wisconsin Card Sorting Test: Heaton,
Chelune, Talley, Kay, & Curtiss, 2000) and executive func-
tions (Tower of London: Culbertson& Zillmer, 2005; Phonemic
and Semantic Verbal Fluency Test: Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987).
No additional impairments were found in working memory
(sub-test “Working Memory” of the Italian version of the Test
of Attentional Performance: Zimmerman & Fimm, 1992;
Zoccolotti et al., 1994), long-term and short-term verbal
memory (BuschkeeFuld Test: Buschke & Fuld, 1974; Spinnler
& Tognoni, 1987, Digit Span: Orsini et al., 1987) and spatial
memory (ReyeOsterrieth Complex Figure Test: Caffarra,
Vezzadini, Dieci, Zonato, & Venneri, 2014; Osterrieth, 1944,
Corsi-Block tapping test: Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987), or logical
and reasoning abilities (Raven's Progressive Matrices: Spinnler
& Tognoni, 1987). In addition, TP showed no sign of apraxia
with either limbs or hands (Test of limb apraxia: De Renzi,
Motti, & Nichelli, 1980; De Renzi, Pieczuro, & Vignolo, 1968).
She hadmild paresiswith hypotonia of her left upper limb and
hand. Both superficial and deep sensitivity were normal.
TP complained of her left hand behaving in an uncon-
trolled manner. For example, she reported that her left hand
threw a towel into the bathtub full of water or that she blew
her nose with a napkin that she held in her left hand, instead
of using the handkerchief in her right hand. The episodes of
uncontrolled behaviour of her left hand occurred on a daily
basis in the first few months after the lesion and were char-
acterized by groping movements, grasping, subsequent
inability to release the grip, utilization behaviour and the
persistent feeling of unresponsiveness of the left hand. At that
time, TP also had frequent episodes ofmirrormovements (i.e.,
the anarchic left hand reproduced the movement of the un-
affected right hand), and also reported the inability to coor-
dinate simultaneous different movements of the two hands.
At the time of the testing session, the frequency of the epi-
sodes of uncontrolled behaviour was reduced. Episodes of
grasping behaviour and subsequent inability to release the
grip occurred almost once a week. TP complained of the
persistent feeling of unresponsiveness of her left hand and
reported her attitude to restrain the actions of her left hand,
by using the other hand to prevent it frommoving. Despite the
lack of voluntary control of her left hand, TP never denied
ownership of the hand.
All experimental procedures were exactly the same in TP
and healthy participants. The only difference is that all the
data were collected from the right hand of the healthy par-
ticipants, while for TP data was collected from both the right
(healthy) hand and the left (affected) hand, in separate
sessions.
2.2. Experimental procedure
After filling the consent form, the general experimental pro-
cedure was explained for the participants. Non-painful elec-
trocutaneous shocks were delivered from a programmable
Digitimer DS5 Bipolar Constant Current Stimulator (Digitimer
Ltd., Welwyn Garden City, UK). Cloth electrodes (Biosense
Medical, Chelmsford, UK) were placed on the proximal and
medial phalanx of the right index finger and were connected
Fig. 1 eMRI scans of the patient TP in sagittal (A) and horizontal (B) view. C. Patient's lesion reconstruction. Mapping of the
brain lesions was performed by MRIcro (Rorden & Brett, 2000). Lesions, as documented by the most recent MRI, were traced
on the T1-weighted template MRI scan from the Montreal Neurological Institute provided with the MRIcro software.
c o r t e x 9 0 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 5 8e7 0 61to the anode and cathode cables, respectively. Intensity of the
shocks depended on the trial type (see later). The duration of
each shock was set at 10 ms.
The behavioural task started after setting up the elec-
trodes. Each experimental session consisted of three tasks:
First, a detection task was used to detect the lowest
threshold level at which participants were able to detect
the shocks. Then, supra- and subliminal levels of shock
were calculated from the threshold measure and a signal
detection task was administered to confirm perception of
the shock stimuli. Participants who did not pass the signal
detection task were excused and did not proceed to the
next step. Finally, participants performed the ‘intentional
binding’ task, which has been widely used as a proxy
measure of sense of agency (for a review, see Moore & Obhi,
2012).2.3. Threshold detection task
An ascending staircase approach was used to detect the
lowest levels at which participants were able to detect the
shock (Moore, Ruge, Wenke, Rothwell, & Haggard, 2010).
Shocks started at .1 mA and increased in steps of .1 mA until
the shock was detected, and then decreased in steps of .05mA
until the shock was missed, and then increased again in steps
of .01 to find the detection threshold. A tone was played at the
time of each shock and participants were asked to report if
they felt a shock at the time of the tone or not. In this and all
the later tasks, participants were instructed to report feeling a
shock when they felt any kind of stimulus, not simply a painful
shock. The level for supraliminal shock stimuli was set at
130% of the threshold level. The subliminal level was deter-
mined by reducing one step (.01 mA) from the threshold (e.g.,
Table 1 e For each brain region, the number (first column)
and the percentage (second column) of lesioned voxels are
shown. Quantitative estimate of the damaged brain
regions and white matter areas was performed by
superimposing the traced lesion reconstruction on the
“automated anatomical labelling” template (AAL) (Rorden
& Brett, 2000), and on the John Hopkins University (JHU)
white matter labels atlas (Rorden, Karnath, & Bonilha,
2007).
Cortical areas Voxels Area %
Olfactory_R 347 15%
Frontal_Mid_Orb_R 13 0%
Cingulum_Ant_L 86 1%
Cingulum_Ant_R 589 6%
Cingulum_Mid_L 234 2%
Cingulum_Mid_R 1050 6%
Cingulum_Post_L 58 2%
Cingulum_Post_R 35 1%
White matter areas Voxels Area %
Unclassified 2281 0%
Genu of corpus callosum 111 1%
Body of corpus callosum 664 5%
Splenium of corpus callosum 714 6%
c o r t e x 9 0 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 5 8e7 062if the detection threshold was .45 mA, the subliminal level
would be .44 mA). This strategy was chosen to ensure that
subliminal shocks had sufficient energy to influence brain
processes, while remaining imperceptible (see below).
2.4. Signal detection task
The estimated supra- and subliminal shock levels were then
validated in a signal detection task. Each signal detection task
consisted of four types of trials in a randomised order: 20
subliminal shock trials, 20 subliminal catch trials (with no
shock), 20 supraliminal shock trials and 20 supraliminal catch
trials (with no shock). In each trial participants heard two
tones, 5 sec apart. They received a supraliminal shock at a
random time between those two tones in supraliminal shock
trials. No shock was delivered in catch trials. In subliminal
trials, a train of subliminal shocks were delivered every 1 sec
starting from the first tone and endingwith the second tone. At
the end of each trial participants were asked to report if they
felt any shock between the first and the second tone or not. At
the end of the task, participants' responses were used to esti-
mates the sensitivity index (d0) for the supra- and subliminal
shocks. To proceed to the next step, participantswere required
to obtain a d0 value within the range of .5e1.5 for subliminal
shocks and a d0 of3 for the supraliminal shocks. The relatively
high sensitivity index for subliminal shocks means that par-
ticipants could sometimes detect the shock. We wished to
ensure that the subliminal shocks were strong enough to in-
fluence brain processes. Those subliminal shocks that were
detected by participants during the main task were discarded
(see Section 2.5). If their d0 did not match this criteria, the
threshold detection task was repeated to find a new threshold
followed by a signal detection task. If the desired d0 was not
achieved after four attempts, participant was excused and did
not proceed to the intentional binding task.2.5. Intentional binding task
We used intentional binding paradigm as an implicit measure
of agency. The task was based on previous studies (Haggard
et al., 2002), and was programmed in LabVIEW 2012 (Austin,
Texas). Participants viewed a clock hand rotating on a com-
puter screen, located 60 cm in front of the participants in a
quiet room. The initial clock position was random. Each full
rotation lasted 2560 ms. Participants made voluntary keypress
by pressing the enter key with their right index finger. Partic-
ipants chose for themselves when to make the voluntary ac-
tions. After each key press, the clock hand stopped at a random
location, participants made a time judgement according to
condition (see later). Each experimental session consisted of
two conditions, presented in separate blocks. At the beginning
of each block, brief instructions for the relevant conditionwere
displayed on the screen. In the baseline condition, participants
had to press the enter key at a time of their own free choice.
The clock hand stopped after 1500e2500 ms (at random), and
participants then judged the clock hand position at the time of
their keypress. In this condition, participant's actions pro-
duced no sensory outcome and they received no shock. In the
agency condition, participants were again asked to press the
key at a time of their own free choice. However, this time each
keypress produced a pure tone (1000 Hz, 100ms duration) after
250 ms and they sometimes received a mild shock on their
right index finger before pressing the key. At the end of each
trial, participants made two subjective reports. First, they re-
ported the clock hand position at the time of their keypress.
Second, they reported whether they had felt a shock or not.
Each block in the agency condition consisted of two types of
trials in a randomised order: in two thirds of the trials a single
supraliminal shock happened at a random time, drawn from
an exponential distribution (min ¼ 1 sec, max ¼ 10 sec,
mean¼ 5 sec) (Fig. 2A and B). In the other one third, a 1 Hz train
of subliminal shocks occurred starting from a random time
within 500 ms from the beginning of the trial and continuing
for 10 sec (Fig. 2C). The train ensures that any keypress occurs
within 1 sec of a shock. In all trials of the agency condition,
participants were asked to press the enter key whenever they
felt like but to press the key ‘as quickly as possible’ if they felt a
shock. Therewere two possible outcomes in trialswith a single
supraliminal shock: either participants waited long enough,
received the supraliminal shock and reacted (Fig. 2B), or they
voluntarily pressed the key before the occurrence of the su-
praliminal shock, in which case the supraliminal shock was
cancelled (Fig. 2A). The former trials were categorised as
‘reactive’ trials, if participants accordingly reported feeling the
shock, and the later trials were categorised as ‘voluntary’ trials,
if participants accordingly reported not feeling a shock.
Trials containing a train of subliminal shocks were also
divided into two categories. First, if the participant reported
perceiving any shock, the trial was discarded. If the partici-
pant did not report perceiving any shock, the trial was cate-
gorized as a ‘primed-voluntary’ trial.
The baseline conditionwas tested in two separate blocks of
15 trials each, at the beginning and end of the experiment. The
agency condition was tested in four blocks of 40 trials each
between the two baseline blocks.
Table 2 eNeuropsychological assessment. Asterisks denote a pathological performance. Patient's scores are reported in the
left column, while cut-off scores are reported in the right column. SS: Standard Score. CS: Correct Score. T: T-value. ScS:
Screening Score. ES: Equivalent Score. The ES ranges from 0 to 4, with 0 ¼ pathological performance, 1 ¼ borderline
performance, and 2e4 ¼ normal performance.
Standard Score (SS)/Correct
Score (CS)/T-value (T)/
Screening Score (ScS)
Cut-off/
Equivalent
Score (ES)
Attention
Test of Attentional Performance
Subtest acoustical vigilance:
- 0e5 min T ¼ 27* T ¼ 40
- 5e10 min T < 20* T ¼ 40
Subtest alertness:
- Without warning T ¼ 20* T ¼ 40
- With warning T ¼ 20* T ¼ 40
Subtest divided attention T ¼ 32* T ¼ 40
Executive Functions
Tower of London
- Total move score SS ¼ 84 SS ¼ 70
- Total correct score SS ¼ 88 SS ¼ 70
- Total rule violation SS  60* SS ¼ 70
- Total time violation SS ¼ 92 SS ¼ 70
- Total initiation time SS ¼ 98 SS ¼ 70
- Total execution time SS ¼ 88 SS ¼ 70
- Total problem-solving time SS ¼ 86 SS ¼ 70
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test SS ¼ 81* SS ¼ 90
Verbal fluency test
- Phonemic CS ¼ 25 ES ¼ 2
- Semantic CS ¼ 52 ES ¼ 4
Working Memory
Test of Attentional Performance
Subtest Working Memory T ¼ 40 T ¼ 40
Memory
Digit span CS ¼ 5 ES ¼ 4
Buschke Fuld
- Long Term Memory score CS ¼ 104 ES ¼ 3
- Consistent Long Term Retrieval CS ¼ 83 ES ¼ 4
- Delayed recall CS ¼ 7.75 ES ¼ 3
Corsi-Block tapping test CS ¼ 4.75 ES ¼ 4
ReyeOsterrieth Complex Figure Test CS ¼ 14.25 ES ¼ 3
Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test ScS ¼ 8* ScS ¼ 9
Logical and reasoning abilities
Raven's Progressive Matrices CS ¼ 30.25 ES ¼ 4
Apraxia
Test of limb apraxia
- Right hand Total score ¼ 70 53
- Left hand Total score ¼ 70 53
c o r t e x 9 0 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 5 8e7 0 632.6. Data analysis
In signal detection task the proportion of hits, correct re-
jections, misses and false alarms were calculated separately
for supra- and subliminal shocks. Thesemeasureswhere then
used to compute the sensitivity index (d0).In the intentional binding task, judgment error was defined
as the difference between the judged clock hand position and
the actual time of the keypress on each trial. A positive judge-
ment error indicated a perceptual delay; a negative judgement
error an anticipation. Themean and SDof the judgement errors
across trials were then measured for each trial type. Action
Fig. 2 e Timeline of an experimental trial. Participants were instructed to look at a rotating clock and to press a key at a time
of their free choice or to react as soon as possible if they felt a shock. In voluntary trials participants pressed the key before
occurrence of a supraliminal shock (large shock sign) (A). In reactive trials they pressed the key immediately after feeling the
supraliminal shock (the supraliminal shock happened at a random time drawn from an exponential distribution) (B). In
primed-voluntary trials a subliminal shock (small shock sign) was delivered every 1 sec till participants pressed the key (C).
Each keypress was followed by a beep 250 ms later. At the end of each trial participants reported the time of their keypress
and whether they received a shock. Dashed lines show hypothetical time of a shock.
c o r t e x 9 0 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 5 8e7 064binding was defined as the shift of reported time of action to-
wards its outcome, and was calculated by subtracting each
participant's mean judgement error in the baseline condition
from that in the agency condition. Thus, perceptual association
of an action with a subsequent tone would produce a positive
value for action binding. We then used repeated-measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) and paired-samples t-test to
compare action binding in voluntary trials with action binding
in primed-voluntary trials. Multilevel models were used when
comparing trial types with unequal sample size, using the lme
function in R (R Core Team, Vienna, Austria). Themain purpose
of having supraliminal shocks was to establish a stimulus-
response association between the shock and the action. We
reasoned that this makes the shock meaningful for action, and
therefore more likely to prime action processing. Finally, a
Crawford test (Crawford, Garthwaite, & Porter, 2010) was used
to compare TP's action binding scores from the healthy and
affected hand with the action binding data in healthy
participants.
We additionally checked whether subliminal shocks could
influence behaviour, as well as sense of agency. The latency of
each keypress from the immediately preceding subliminal
shockwasmeasured. These latencieswere averaged across all
primed-voluntary trials within each participant. We tested the
null hypothesis that the action latencies in primed-voluntary
trials are from a populationwith uniformdistribution by using
a separate AndersoneDarling test for each participant.3. Results
3.1. Experience of agency in healthy participants
Of the 47 recruited participants, 27 met the d0 criteria of the
signal detection task and went on to do the intentionalbinding task. Four participants did not finish the intentional
binding task because their detection threshold was unstable
during the task. Therefore, the final sample included 23 par-
ticipants (16 females, mean age ¼ 22.7, SD ¼ 3.9). The average
detection threshold was .5 mA (SD ¼ .18 mA). The average
supra- and subliminal shock levels were .64 mA (SD ¼ .23 mA)
and .49 mA (SD ¼ .18 mA), respectively. The average d0 for
subliminal shocks was 1.03 (SD ¼ .24). All participants had a
d0  3 for supraliminal shocks (Supplementary Table 1). On
average, participants perceived 8% (SD ¼ 11%) of the sublim-
inal shocks. Importantly, there was no significant relationship
between the frequency of perceiving subliminal shocks and
the size of action binding effect (r ¼ .21, p ¼ .34).
To investigate whether influencing precursor signals to a
voluntary action with a subliminal probe could be reflected in
one's experience of agency, we compared action binding in
primed-voluntary trials and voluntary trials. The perceived time
of action moved towards its outcome in both primed-voluntary
(M ¼ 32 ms, SEM ¼ 7.60 ms, one-sample, t (22) ¼ 4.18, p < .01,
95% CI [16 47]) and voluntary trials (M ¼ 18 ms, SEM ¼ 8.17 ms,
one-sample, t (22)¼ 2.24, p¼ .03, 95% CI [1 35]) (Supplementary
Table 2). However, this action binding was significantly
stronger on trials with a subliminal shock train than on trials
without shocks (t (22) ¼ 2.61, p ¼ .016, dz ¼ .54, 95% CI [3 24])
(Fig. 3A). This suggests that experience of agency towards an
action and its effect is associated with precursor brain signals
for that action.
Importantly, the effect of subliminal primes on intentional
binding was not simply a reduced version of the effect of su-
praliminal shocks on time estimation. On supraliminal trials,
we found that the perceived time of reactions moved away
from the outcome tone towards the preceding supraliminal
shock stimulus, in a reversal of the intentional binding effect
(M ¼ 68 ms, SEM ¼ 23 ms, one-sample, t (22) ¼ 2.90, p < .01,
95% CI [116 19]). This reversal of intentional binding for
Fig. 3 e Data of healthy participants. A. Action binding in
voluntary and primed-voluntary trials. *p < .05. B. Time
histogram of latency of actions from their preceding
subliminal shock (time 0), averaged across all primed-
voluntary trials and all participants. Binding effects are
drawn to scale and all values are in ms.
c o r t e x 9 0 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 5 8e7 0 65responses to a supraliminal stimulus has been reported pre-
viously: (Waszak et al., 2005). This finding suggests that the
increase in action binding for primed-voluntary compared to
voluntary trials could not be merely explained by the presen-
tation of shocks.
Finally, to make sure that unbalanced number of trials is
not confounding the results, participants' action binding data
in each trial type was weighted by the ratio of number of trials
in that condition to total number of trials. The significant
difference between the conditions (t (22) ¼ 2.25, p ¼ .03,
dz ¼ .47, 95% CI [1 16]) suggests that action binding is signifi-
cantly stronger in trials with a subliminal shock even after
controlling for unbalanced number of trials.
If subliminal shocks influence brain processes during ac-
tion preparation, we might expect to find the effects not only
on experience of agency but on some other behavioural mea-
sure such as action initiation. We therefore tested the hy-
pothesis that the subliminal shocks influenced the latency of
keypresses, by using the AndersoneDarling test to compare
keypress latency on primed-voluntary trials to a uniform
random distribution. The action latency distribution was
significantly non-uniform in seven participants
(Supplementary Table 3). The null hypothesis that this many
tests being significant could happen by chance alone was
examined using a binomial test. By the binomial distribution,
the probability of getting seven significant non-uniformaction
latency distributions in a sample of 23 by chance is B (.05, 7,
23) ¼ .00009401 (Fig. 3B). This suggests that subliminal shock
has some influence on behaviour. However, the presence andpattern of this effect differed across participants. While in
some participants subliminal shocks facilitated action initia-
tion, in others it delayed the time of the action
(Supplementary Fig. 1).
3.2. Experience of agency in an individual with anarchic
hand syndrome
TP was tested in two separate sessions, one session for the
right (healthy) hand and the other for the left (affected) hand.
Detection threshold in the first and second sessions was
.65 mA and .84 mA, respectively. d0 for subliminal shocks in
the first and second sessions was .80 and .68, respectively.
When testing the healthy hand, perceptual time of action
moved towards its outcome in both voluntary trials (M¼ 58ms,
SEM ¼ 23 ms, one-sample, t (28) ¼ 2.54, p ¼ .017, 95% CI [11
105]), and primed-voluntary trials (M ¼ 100 ms, SEM ¼ 21 ms,
one-sample, t (36) ¼ 4.82, p < .01, 95% CI [58 142]) (Fig. 4A). In
the second session, when testing the affected hand, actions
did not bind to their outcomes in voluntary trials (M ¼ 35 ms,
SEM¼ 20ms, one-sample, t (31)¼ 1.76, p¼ .088, 95%CI [6 77]),
or primed-voluntary trials (M ¼ 45 ms, SEM ¼ 40 ms, one-
sample, t (23) ¼ 1.13, p ¼ .27, 95% CI [127 37]) (Fig. 4A).
Given the unequal number of trials in each condition, factorial
repeated-measure ANOVA was performed in a multilevel
model with the within subject factors of hand (healthy vs
affected) and trial type (voluntary vs primed-voluntary). We
found a significant main effect of hand (X2 (6) ¼ 9.66, p < .01),
but no significant main effect of trial type (X2 (7) ¼ .31, p ¼ .58).
Importantly, the interaction between hand and trial type was
significant (X2 (8) ¼ 5.80, p ¼ .016). Post-hoc analysis with
Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that the difference in ac-
tion binding between the two hands was due to the primed-
voluntary trial types (p ¼ .038), not the voluntary trials (p ¼ .84)
(Fig. 4A & Supplementary Table 4).
The time histogram of latency of keypresses from their
preceding subliminal shock in primed-voluntary trials is shown
for the healthy (Fig. 4B) and the affected (Fig. 4C) hands of TP.
Based on the AndersoneDarling test, the distribution of action
latencies was not significantly different from a uniform dis-
tribution, in the healthy or the affected hand (p > .1). This
finding, however, should be considered in the face of low
number of trials from a single case.
3.3. Experience of agency in TP vs healthy participants
Finally, we tested whether subliminal shock effects on action
binding were significantly different in TP and healthy par-
ticipants, using Crawford test. This method tests whether a
single patient's score differs significantly from that in a
control group, and also provides a point estimate of the
separation between the patient's score and the control group
(Crawford et al., 2010). The effect of the subliminal shocks
was measured by subtracting each participant's action bind-
ing in primed-voluntary trials from voluntary trials. The effect
of subliminal shock on experience of agency, as measured by
action binding, did not differ significantly between healthy
participants and the healthy hand of TP (t ¼ 1.14, p ¼ .27,
Zcc ¼ 1.16). However, while subliminal shocks enhanced ac-
tion binding in healthy participants (subliminal shock
Fig. 4 e Data of TP. A. Action binding in voluntary and primed-voluntary trials for the healthy and the affected hand. *p < .05.
B&C. Time histogram of latency of actions from their preceding subliminal shock, averaged across all primed-voluntary
trials, displayed separately for the healthy (B) and the affected hand (C). Binding effects are drawn to scale and all values are
in ms.
c o r t e x 9 0 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 5 8e7 066effect ¼ 14 ms), they reduced it in the affected hand of TP
(subliminal shock effect ¼ 80 ms), hence showing an
opposite effect (t ¼ 3.64, p < .01, Zcc ¼ 3.72). Finally, we
tested whether strong action binding in the primed-voluntary
trials of the healthy hand of TP is also suggestive of an
abnormal intentional binding. Crawford tests showed no
significant difference between the action binding of the un-
affected hand of TP and the healthy participants in the
primed-voluntary (t ¼ 1.85, p ¼ .08, Zcc ¼ 1.89) or the voluntary
trials (t ¼ 1.00, p ¼ .33, Zcc ¼ 1.03).4. Discussion
Healthy subjects and an individual with AHS were exposed to
subliminal electrocutaneous stimulus during the precursor
period before performing internally-generated actions that
produced an external outcome. We used an established im-
plicit measure based on time perception to measure sense of
agency. The perceived time of an action has been found to
shift towards its outcome for voluntary actions but not for
involuntary movements (Haggard et al., 2002). Using this
‘intentional binding’ index, we developed a new paradigm to
investigate how sense of agency might be influenced by
external subliminal stimuli. On one view, such stimuli might
influence internal precursors of voluntary action, which in
turn influence sense of agency. We investigated whether
these subliminal shocks might influence sense of agency by
boosting a putative ‘internal volitional signal’. On another view,
sense of agency is based only on reconstructive inferences
about perceptual events associated with action and outcome.
Since the shocks were not perceived, this model cannot
readily explain any effect of shock on sense of agency
measures.4.1. Subliminal primes boost sense of agency in healthy
participants
The perceived time of endogenous actions moved towards
their outcomes in both voluntary and primed-voluntary trials.
Crucially, action binding was significantly stronger in primed-
voluntary trials where actions were preceded by a subliminal
shock, compared to when they were not. The direction of the
effect, shifting action perception towards the subsequent
outcome, rules out explanations based on P-centre phenom-
ena (Morton,Marcus,& Frankish, 1976), or anchoring effects of
the preceding shocks on time perception. Further, as partici-
pants could not feel the subliminal shocks, this difference is
unlikely to reflect a conscious decision to control actions in a
different way. Most importantly, the difference in action
binding between trial types could not easily be explained by a
purely post-hoc inference account of sense of agency, since
the events perceived are identical in both conditions.
Previous studies showed that explicit agency judgements
could be modulated by using visual subliminal priming
(Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Chambon, Sidarus, & Haggard,
2014; Haggard & Chambon, 2012). Participants reported stron-
ger experience of agency over action effects when the sublim-
inal primewas compatible, compared to incompatible,with the
selected action (Wenke et al., 2010). In those studies, as in our
experiment, the prime influenced a stage of action preparation
that necessarily precedes both action and its effect. This sug-
gests that sense of agency cannot be purely retrospective.
Rather sense of agencymust depend, at least in part, on signals
arising during action preparation. Of course, this does not rule
out a further contribution from retrospective inference.
Additionally, given that subliminal shocks increased our
measure of sense of agency, external stimulation facilitated
putative precursor signals during action preparation. At first
c o r t e x 9 0 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 5 8e7 0 67sight, this may seem paradoxical, given the traditional di-
chotomy between brain systems underlying internally-
generated and externally-triggered actions (Passingham
et al., 2010). However, substantial cross-talk between the
two systems exists. In one study, the reaction time to an
external-trigger stimulus was reduced in the very final phases
of preparation of a voluntary action (Obhi, Matkovich,& Chen,
2009; also see:; Hughes, Schu¨tz-Bosbach, &Waszak, 2011). We
speculate that during action preparation, the subliminal
shock is taken as an additional environmental cue. The sub-
liminal shockmay “nudge” the signal that generates voluntary
action, facilitating a threshold crossing event (Schurger, Sitt,&
Dehaene, 2012). In our paradigm, participants also occasion-
ally reacted to supraliminal shocks. It remains unclear
whether this prior association between shock and action is
essential for the subliminal priming we observed. We hope to
investigate this point in future experiments. Interestingly, we
also found some statistical evidence for effects of shock on
action initiation. However, this effect was not present in all
participants, and the pattern of influence differed across
participants. While in some participants subliminal shocks
transiently facilitated action initiation, in others it delayed the
time of the action. We note that inhibitory, as well as excit-
atory, time-dependent effects of subliminal shocks have been
widely reported (e.g., Blankenburg et al., 2003). We speculate
that subliminal shocks may not only sum with the precursor
signals during action preparation but also change the
threshold for the initiation of the voluntary action. The pre-
cise moment of action initiation thus depends on both signal
amplitude and the current threshold.
4.2. Subliminal primes reduce sense of agency in an
anarchic hand
Patients with AHS often complain of lack of agency for
movementsmade by their affected hand. This was reflected in
action binding data from the left (affected) hand of TP. While
she perceived the time of the endogenous actions that were
performed by her right (unaffected) hand as shifted towards
their outcomes, this perceptual shift did not happen for
endogenous actions of her affected hand. This finding based
on our implicit measure of sense of agency is also in line with
TP's subjective reports of episodes of lack of control of her left
hand (see Section 2.1).
Interestingly, the significant interaction between hand and
trial type showed that subliminal shock enhances sense of
agency similar to healthy participants, but only when applied
to the healthy hand. Subliminal shock had no statistical effect
when applied to the affected hand. We suggest that, for the
affected hand, a mechanism that uses precursor signals of
voluntary action to compute sense of agency is now disrupted.
The normal function of this mechanism would include inte-
grating signals from the external environment and from in-
ternal states to construct a coherent subjective experience of
action.
Normal behaviour is an outcome of active interplay be-
tween internal states and the external environment. Suc-
cessful interaction of these two components is crucial for
goal-directed behaviour and inhibition of unwantedresponses. Patients with focal damage in medial frontal
cortex (though without signs of AHS) show disruption to
automatic motor inhibition, as evident in a reversal of the
normal negative compatibility effect in a masked-prime
task (Sumner et al., 2007). Abnormal facilitation by prim-
ing, as well as the involuntary object-oriented actions that
characterise AHS, could both be viewed as productive
symptoms reflecting damage to a brain system that nor-
mally inhibits excessive environmental reactivity. Our re-
sults suggest a second aspect to AHS. The normal subjective
experience of action is altered in AHS, and in particular the
capacity to feel a sense of agency for voluntary actions that
are appropriately interfaced to subtle cues in the external
environment.
The brain lesions of TP mostly involved the right anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) and the posterior part of corpus cal-
losum (CC) (Fig. 1 & Table 1). Lesions in these areas have been
previously reported in patients with AHS (Hassan & Josephs,
2016). One fMRI study compared brain activity during alien
hand and voluntary movements of a patient with AHS (Assal,
Schwartz, & Vuilleumier, 2007). While alien hand movements
were associated with isolated activity in contralateral motor
cortex, voluntary movements of the same hand activated
extensive networks including the ACC, suggesting a possible
role of ACC in voluntary action control. Moreover, ACC has
been shown to be active during self- and external-agency
attribution tasks (Fukushima, Goto, Maeda, Kato, & Umeda,
2013; Nahab et al., 2011). Other case studies have associated
lesions in the CC with volitional disorders of AHS (Della Sala,
Marchetti, & Spinnler, 1991; Feinberg, Schindler, Flanagan, &
Haber, 1992). CC connects the frontal and motor areas of the
two hemispheres. Specifically, the body and splenium of CC,
which are mainly damaged in TP, connect the premotor areas
(Berlucchi, 2012). Damage to this area could thus lead to loss of
transcallosalmotor inhibition of the contralateral hemisphere
(Kim, Lee, Lee, & Lee, 2014). Interestingly, Wolpe et al. (2014)
found a relation between CC white matter loss and
abnormal intentional binding in patients with alien limb due
to corticobasal degeneration. This deficit was largely confined
to anterior parts of CC.
Patients with AHS commonly report that their hand is not
under their control or being controlled by an external agent
(e.g., Assal et al., 2007). Our work suggests that this phenom-
enology may arise from two distinct sources. The first source,
and the only one recognised in the current literature, is the
positive symptom of the affected hand's performing unde-
sired movements in response to the external world. We sug-
gest here a second source of AHS phenomenology, namely a
reduced sense of agency for one's own voluntary actions. In
the normal brain, voluntary actions do not come “from no-
where”, but are aligned to subtle action possibilities suggested
by the environment, akin to subliminal priming in laboratory
experiment. Such priming increases explicit judgements of
agency (Wenke et al., 2010), and increased intentional binding
in healthy volunteers. However, this mechanism was absent
for the affected hand of our AHS patient. To our knowledge,
this is the first study to investigate a negative symptomof AHS
by measuring the effect of the external world on experiences
of voluntary actions.
Fig. 5 e A cognitive framework for experience of voluntary action in healthy participants, and anarchic hand syndrome.
c o r t e x 9 0 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 5 8e7 0684.3. Sense of agency as a readout of internal volitional
signals: a cognitive model
Based on our findings from healthy participants and TP we
propose a cognitive model of the experience of voluntary ac-
tion (Fig. 5).We suggest that one key input to the experience of
agency is a readout of an internal volitional signal that pre-
cedes endogenous actions. This internal signal, however,
could be influenced by externally-triggered signals from the
outside environment (affordances): volition is not indepen-
dent of the current environment and response space (Schu¨u¨r
& Haggard, 2011). In the case of healthy participants and the
unaffected hand of TP, this external signal is integrated into
the internal volitional signal to facilitate action preparation.
Thus, the weak sensory evidence suggesting action that is
provided by a subliminal prime is summed with the intention
or predisposition to act provided by the task instruction. This
integration is accordingly reflected in a stronger action bind-
ing and an altered distribution of acting. Thus, suggestions of
the external environment are integrated with intentions, and
the sense of agency depends partly on a metacognitive
readout from the output of this ‘integrator’ (Fig. 5, node 1)
(Fleming & Frith, 2014).
This interface between the will and the external world is
damaged in AHS (Fig. 5). Classical descriptions of AHS suggest
that intentional control no longer inhibits affordance-based
responding e resulting in compulsive or utilisation behav-
iours (Fig. 5, node 2) (McBride et al., 2013; Riddoch et al., 1998).
The affected hand sometimes reacts to the external world due
to loss of the normal inhibitory signal of volition (Sumner
et al., 2007). Accordingly, the patient's experience of actions
is no longer driven by metacognitive readout of one's own
intentions, but is instead driven by experience of actual motor
outputs triggered by environmental stimuli. As a result, pa-
tients with AHS frequently describe movements of the
affected hand as involuntary, evenwhen they arewell-formed
and co-ordinated. For example, patients may report that their
affected hand ‘has a mind of its own’, ‘is being ‘naughty’,
‘doing what it wants, not what I want’, etc.
This model contains the inhibitory link from the voluntary
to the reactivemotor system that is classically associatedwith
AHS (Fig. 5, node 2). Our results here suggest that the interface
also involves a second link, whereby the external environ-
ment, even inmild subliminal form, can gently nudge volition
(Fig. 5, node 1). This nudge can lead to changed behaviour, asin subliminal priming (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2002), but also
changed experience of volition, as in the altered sense of
agency here. Damage to the interface area in AHS also
weakens this second facilitatory link between the external
environment and volition, preventing the normal subliminal
facilitation of sense of agency. Taken overall, a healthy sense
of agency requires that the voluntary motor system be
responsive to appropriate external suggestions when these
align with one's own wishes, while retaining the ability to
suppress externally-driven actions when these are not
desired. Our results suggest that the cingulate and the cal-
losum participate in this bidirectional interaction.5. Conclusions
We developed a novel paradigm to investigate the contribu-
tion of precursor signals of endogenous actions to sense of
agency. We showed that experience of agency is a meta-
cognitive readout of an interaction between internal volitional
signals and the outside world, and not merely a post-hoc
confabulation. Interestingly, this interaction was impaired in
a patient with anarchic hand syndrome. These findings may
help us better understand the mechanisms of volition and
sense of agency and to better characterise the neurological
disorders of volition.
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